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Abstract
We present a simulation environment with 3-
D stereo visualization facilities destined for an
easy setup and versatile assessment of fault de-
tection and diagnosis based fault tolerant control
systems. This environment has been primarily
developed as a technology demonstrator of ad-
vanced reconfigurable flight control systems and
is based on a realistic six degree of freedom flexi-
ble aircraft model. The aircraft control system ar-
chitecture includes a flexible fault detection and
diagnosis system and a reconfigurable nonlinear
dynamic inversion based controller, able to han-
dle different fault situations.
1 Introduction
The complexity of technical systems has been
continuously growing in the last years to face
various challenges like highly optimized perfor-
mance, increased safety demands, reduced de-
sign and operation costs. A typical challeng-
ing application is the design of advanced flight
control systems (FCS) for large transport air-
craft aiming to significantly reduce the work-
load of pilots, ensuring best handling qualities si-
multaneously with increased passenger comfort
and safety. Despite a high system complexity,
the fault tolerant operation of an aircraft has to
be guaranteed over the whole flight envelope in
presence of many possible unexpected events and
inherent uncertainties in the operation environ-
ment. To ensure flight safety and increase flight
autonomy, the aircraft industry traditionally uses
(physical) actuator and sensor redundancy. How-
ever, this hardware-redundancy based fault detec-
tion and diagnosis (FDD) approach is becoming
increasingly problematic when used in conjunc-
tion with the many innovative technical solutions
being developed by the aeronautical sector to sat-
isfy the greener and safer imperatives demanded
by the society.
In the recent years, to alleviate this safety
bottleneck, efforts have been invested to develop
fault tolerant control (FTC) architectures which
strongly rely on advanced model based FDD
techniques. Developing high performance FTC
is an interdisciplinary activity encompassing as-
pects of advanced control techniques (e.g., adap-
tive, reconfigurable, robust), fault detection and
isolation, multi-objective optimization, as well
as real-time implementation of FDD-based FTC
schemes. Each of these disciplines is a field of
intensive research itself. Therefore, the success-
ful application of FTC is not a trivial task and re-
quires an optimal combination of various aspects.
A typical FTC architecture based on FDD
techniques is depicted in Fig. 1. The FDD part
usually includes the generation of the residual
signals [2], (norm-based) evaluation of residual
signals and (thresholds-based) decision making
[8]. The fault identification part determines the
fault type and size, and triggers the appropriate
reconfiguration of the controller, to ensure a safe
system operation in the presence of faults.
In this paper we describe a dedicated desk-
top environment developed at DLR for the setup,
simulation-based assessment and optimization-
based tuning of FTC architectures as that pre-
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Fig. 1 Fault diagnosis based fault tolerant control
sented in Fig. 1. In section 2 the detection, iso-
lation and identification algorithms used to ful-
fill different fault monitoring tasks are discussed
in detail. Further, the corresponding generic
Simulink blockset allowing rapid prototyping of
the fault monitoring system is covered in this sec-
tion. An overview of the simulation environment
including a realistic six degree of freedom flexi-
ble aircraft model, together with its fault models,
a complete fault monitoring system and a fault
tolerant controller is presented in section 3. Sec-
tion 4 covers some simulation results and finally,
the outlook in section 5 briefly describes planned
enhancements and improvements.
2 Fault Monitoring
Fault monitoring in a system can be done in
different degrees of accuracy, depending on
whichever information is required. Basic fault
detection algorithms provide information of the
occurrence of any fault in the system. Advanced
fault detection and isolation algorithms are able
to exactly localize the fault in the system. Fault
detection together with fault isolation are often
referred to as fault diagnosis. A further step is the
so called fault identification providing qualitative
and quantitative information on the occurred fault
(e.g., position at which an actuator is stuck). In
many cases fault tolerant control is only possible
if the exact information on the nature and mag-
nitude of the fault is available. This confers fault
identification an essential role in any fault toler-
ant control system.
Fig. 2 presents an overview of the main tasks
of a fault monitoring system. Typically, such a
system processes the controlled input vector u
and the measured output vector y and delivers es-
timations of the values of a fault signal f . The
residual signal r is generated by a residual gener-
ator to indicate the presence or absence of a fault.
For this purpose, a residual evaluation signal θ
(e.g., an approximation of the norm of r) serves
as basis for the decision making, where θ is com-
pared to a pre-defined threshold. The resulting
decision signal i (e.g., indicating the localization
of the fault) may trigger fault identification pro-
cessing to finally calculate the value f of the fault
in the system.
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Fig. 2 Main tasks of fault monitoring
A detailed description of the algorithms used
to accomplish theses steps and an overview of the
corresponding generic Simulink blockset is given
in the following subsections.
2.1 Residual Generation
Residual generators shall provide residual signals
indicating the occurrence of faults in a system,
using the systems input u and output y. In the
presence of disturbances, noise and uncertain-
ties the design of such residual generators can
become a highly demanding task. In the ideal
case the residuals are decoupled from these ef-
fects and are highly sensitive only to the faults.
Depending on the purpose of the FDD system, a
residual generator with a scalar output may com-
ply with the need of fault detection, whereas a
bank of residual generators may be required for
fault detection and isolation. Various different
approaches have been developed in recent years
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to solve the fault detection and isolation prob-
lem. For the design of the residual generators
presented in this paper we rely on recently de-
veloped numerically reliably algorithms and ded-
icated robust numerical software tools developed
within DLR [2], [4].
In general, residual generators can be de-
signed to work either on a system-wide or on
component level, both possibilities showing ad-
vantages and disadvantages in their implementa-
tion and application. System-wide approaches in
aircraft fault monitoring show their strength es-
pecially in cases when certain control surfaces
are damaged, i.e. their efficiency is degraded,
as the position sensors within actuators are not
able to provide information about the surface’s
efficiency. Also, the estimation of critical sen-
sor faults can be done only on system-wide level.
The main drawback of using system-wide resid-
ual generators is the large number of uncer-
tainties (e.g., uncertain aerodynamics) and noise
sources (gusts, measurements) they have to ro-
bustly cope with, which represents a real chal-
lenge for the design algorithms.
Uncertainties and noise are also existent for
residual generators working on component level,
however on a much lower level. Furthermore,
models of single components are usually less
complex than the overall (nonlinear) model of an
aircraft, such that the complexity and design ef-
fort for component-level residual generators may
be reduced. For example, they are well suited for
monitoring some actuator faults (e.g., stuck, run-
away) and are therefore used in the FDD system
of the underlying simulation model presented in
this paper. On the other hand, component level
approaches assume the availability of perfect lo-
cal sensor data, and therefore may have diffi-
culties discerning between real component faults
and sensor induced faults. For the simulation
example presented later in this paper the focus
lies on a component level FDD approach, where
fault isolation can be achieved for each moni-
tored component (actuator) for specific classes of
faults.
2.2 Signal Evaluation and Decision Making
The evaluation of the residual signal often re-
quires the computation of a measure of the resid-
ual signal energy, for which the 2-norm of the sig-
nal is usually an appropriate choice. Two approx-
imations of the 2-norm are implemented in the
fault monitoring system of the simulation model.
In what follows we describe them for continuous
signals. Similar evaluation signals can be com-
puted for sampled signals as well.
The so called sliding-window evaluation sig-
nal
θ(t) = αr2(t)+β
∫ t
t−T
r2(τ)dτ, (1)
approximates the 2-norm on a finite sliding-
window of width T , where α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 are
weights for instantaneous and long-term values,
respectively. For a real time implementation, (1)
can be expressed as the output of a first order
delay-differential equation
ρ˙ = r2(t)
θ(t) = αr2(t)+β(ρ(t)−ρ(t−T )). (2)
This representation is used for the implementa-
tion of the evaluation algorithms in the Simulink
blockset.
Alternatively, the so called Narendra signal
evaluation can be used
θ(t) = αr2(t)+β
∫ t
0
e−γ(t−τ)r2(τ)dτ, (3)
which can be generated by a first order differen-
tial equation
ρ˙(t) = −γρ(t)+βr2(t)
θ(t) = ρ(t)+αr2(t), (4)
where γ is the forgetting factor, playing a simi-
lar role as the time window width T in (1). The
signal θ(t) is compared to a specific threshold Jth
and is ideally equal to zero or sufficiently small
in fault free situations, whereas it shall exceed the
threshold Jth when a fault occurs in the system.
Hence, the appropriate selection of the values of
the free parameters α, β, and T or γ, together with
an appropriate threshold Jth essentially influences
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the performance of the FDD system. Typical per-
formance criteria in this context are the minimum
detectable fault magnitude, the false alarm rate,
the missed detection rate or the detection delay.
Multi objective optimization may be used to tune
these parameters and to optimize the above per-
formance criteria.
The decision making process finally deter-
mines if a fault is present in the system or not
by comparing the evaluation signal θ(t) to the
threshold Jth, where the decision logic
θ(t) < Jth ⇒ i(t) = 0 ⇒ no fault
θ(t) ≥ Jth ⇒ i(t) = 1 ⇒ fault (5)
is used. If a residual generator with multiple
outputs rk, k = 1, ...,q is designed, each evalua-
tion signal θk(t) is compared to its corresponding
threshold Jth,k and the components of the vector
i(t) are set according to the following logic
θk(t) < Jth,k ⇒ ik(t) = 0
θk(t) ≥ Jth,k ⇒ ik(t) = 1 (6)
If so called strong fault isolation is provided by
the residual generator, each component rk of the
residual vector r indicates the presence or ab-
sence of the corresponding fault fk of the fault
vector f (of dimension q) and is decoupled from
all other faults. The resulting nonzero com-
ponents of the vector i(t) thus directly indicate
which faults are present.
If only weak fault isolation is provided by
the residual generator, the resulting decision vec-
tor i(t) has to be additionally compared to the
columns of a q×m f fault signature matrix S,
where m f is the number of faults (or fault com-
binations) which are coded in S. For example,
a matching with column k of S may indicate the
presence of fault fk (see [8] for further details).
Multiple faults may not always be isolated with
residual generators providing weak fault isola-
tion because of the inherent coupling of the faults
and residuals, due to the lack of sufficient out-
put measurements. However, while residual gen-
erators providing strong fault isolation can cope
with multiple faults, strong fault isolation is not
always possible, as the achievable decoupling
mainly depends on the available number of mea-
surements.
The evaluation and decision methods pre-
sented above are included in a recently devel-
oped Simulink blockset [9] , which includes ad-
ditional enhancements as decision schemes based
on more sophisticated weak isolation algorithms
(e.g., rk are vectors instead of scalars) and dis-
crete time processing counterparts. The rich
functionality of this blockset allows to easily
generate and implement FDD systems closely
adapted to the characteristics of the underlying
models. In addition, m-functions have been im-
plemented, to automatically generate parts or
even the whole Simulink model of the FDD
system. Especially when dealing with several
residual generators running in parallel (e.g., in
a multi-model based approach), these functions
have proven their usefulness.
2.3 Fault Identification
Providing complete information on the charac-
teristics of occurred faults is of paramount im-
portance for the ongoing safe system operations
of fault tolerant control schemes. The task of
fault identification is to gather such quantitative
and qualitative information on faults. Fault iden-
tification can be performed using various tech-
niques, as for example, on-line parameter estima-
tion, feature extraction using digital signal pro-
cessing (e.g., fast Fourier or wavelet transforms),
signal detection methods, or even multi model
based model detection [5]. Statistical signal pro-
cessing methods based on mean and covariance
computations are frequently employed to identify
simple faults like stuck devices (actuator/sensor),
runaways, or efficiency losses of actuators. The
detection of oscillatory failure case of flight actu-
ators can be addressed using specialized spectral
analysis techniques [6].
3 Simulation Environment
Fig. 3 shows the block diagram of the imple-
mented fault tolerant control system architecture
built around a highly sophisticated model of a
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flexible aircraft. The aircraft model also includes
actuator and sensor models with additional fault
inputs, to allow the injection of various fault sig-
nals (see also Fig. 1). A complete FDD and fault
identification system is part of the FTC architec-
ture and serves for triggering controller reconfig-
uration actions. The reconfigurable controller is
based on nonlinear dynamic inversion (NDI) and
enables safe operations for several fault scenar-
ios.
The aircraft behavior can be visualized in
real-time with a 3-D stereo system. Besides the
full autonomic modes the aircraft can be flown
manually, hence, a high quality 2-D digital in-
strument panel has been developed including a
fault monitoring display. The injection of fault
signals can be activated from the fault control
panel over a computer network connection. The
single elements of the environment are described
in more detail in the following.
Manual 
Control
FDI+FID
Fault 
Injection
Cockpit 
Display
NDI 
Controller
3D –Visual-
ization
Telemetry
Aircraft 
Dynamic
Autopilot
Fig. 3 Fault Tolerant Control Simulation Setup
3.1 Aircraft Model
The structure of the generic closed-loop aircraft
simulation model is shown in Fig. 1. The aircraft
input vector u of dimension 24 includes the de-
manded deflections of 2 outer ailerons (left/right
wing), 2 inner ailerons (left/right wing), 12 spoil-
ers (6 on the left wing/ 6 on the right wing),
2 elevators (left/right), one horizontal stabilizer,
one rudder and four engine throttles positions
(left/right). The aircraft model consists of the ac-
tuators block (including actuator dynamics, ac-
tuator saturations and the actuator fault models),
the aircraft block (including flight mechanics,
structural dynamics, aerodynamics, propulsion,
environment) and the sensors block (including
the sensor dynamics and the sensor fault models).
The output vector y includes all measurable vari-
ables required to control and monitor the aircraft,
as well as the measurements provided to the pilot
via the cockpit display.
3.1.1 Actuators with Faults
The generic, nonlinear aircraft model includes
several redundant control surfaces in all three
axes enabling the accommodation of actuator and
sensor faults. Each actuator model is a first order
system with the commanded surface deflection u
as input and the resulting surface deflection uac as
output. Furthermore typical actuator faults like
"stuck actuator", "actuator runaway" and "loss of
efficiency" are modeled as additional inputs f to
the model. The corresponding LTI model is given
by
x˙act = τ−1(−xact +u+ f )
uac = xact
(7)
where the value of the time constant τ varies from
actuator to actuator for different control surfaces.
The transfer functions from u to uac and f to uac
are thus equal to
Gu(s) =
1
τs+1
Furthermore, upper and lower position limita-
tions umax and respectively umin on the actuator
input u(t) and a rate saturation u˙max on u˙(t) are
also parts of the actuator model, so that
u˜ = F(u,umax,umin, u˙max) (8)
is the actual input applied instead u via a gener-
ally nonlinear mapping F .
To monitor actuator faults at component
level, a simple linear residual generator as pre-
sented in (7) is used with the input-output form
r(s) = uac(s)−Gu(s)u˜(s). (9)
where r(s), uac(s) and u˜(s) are Laplace-
transformed vectors. Notice that due to the pres-
ence of position- and rate limitations within the
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actuator model, the actual input u˜ is used instead
u.
To inject fault signals into the actuator mod-
els, a fault control panel has been developed to
define and activate external fault control inputs
for actuators as shown in Fig. 4. This feature is
also helpful when fulfilling pilot-in-the-loop mis-
sions, as the faults can be activated independently
by a supervising person and the resulting pilot be-
havior can be investigated.
Fig. 4 Fault Control Panel
3.1.2 Fault Tolerant Controller
The nominal controller has six outputs consist-
ing of one roll, one pitch, one yaw command,
two engine throttle commands and a speed brake
command. The basic controller is based on non-
linear dynamic inversion (NDI) and is designed
to ensure adequate flying and handling qualities
in fault-free situations. A control distribution
block has been implemented to distribute the six
commands to the 24 actuator inputs. Control re-
configuration actions (as a results of fault occur-
rence) can be easily performed by changing the
entries of the underlying control distribution ma-
trix.
The control reconfiguration happens in two
steps. As soon as the FDD algorithms detect and
isolate a fault, the distribution block of the con-
troller is reconfigured so that the affected con-
trol surface does not receive any commands from
the controller any more. The required forces and
moments are allocated to the remaining control
devices. If the fault can be identified in a sec-
ond step, the controller compensates the identi-
fied fault value in its feed-forward path and han-
dles it like a measurable disturbance, further im-
proving the aircraft performance in the fault sit-
uation [1]. While this reconfiguration approach
leads usually to higher workloads of the fault-free
surfaces and may even result in an asymmetric
behavior, still it ensures a sufficient controllabil-
ity of the aircraft by exploiting the available ac-
tuation redundancy.
3.2 Visualization
Besides a striking illustration of the aircraft sta-
tus, the visualization must allow a better and
more intuitive understanding of the controlled
aircraft behavior. The aircraft and its environ-
ment is visualized with a highly sophisticated 3-
D stereo visualization tool, enabling visualiza-
tions in real time, as depicted in Fig. 5. The visu-
alization has been adjusted for fault monitoring
purposes so that control surface with and without
failures are clearly distinguishable. For example,
the inner left aileron in Fig. 5 is faulty and there-
fore displayed in red.
To be able to manually fly the aircraft basic
cockpit displays (Primary Flight Display (PFD),
Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) and Engine
Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS))
have been developed. For a better cueing of pilots
and to allow monitoring of the pilot actions in
fault situations the displays have been enhanced
with a fault monitoring display as shown in Fig.
6 [7].
4 Simulation Results
Fig. 7 shows a typical actuator fault situation
(stuck) and the resulting FDD signal processing.
Before the actuator fault occurs at t f ,act , the ac-
tuator output signal uac follows the input signal
u. During the presence of the fault (t f ,act < t ≤
t f ,dea) the actuator (and therefore the correspond-
ing control surface) is stuck. As soon as the
residual evaluation signal θ(t) exceeds its prede-
fined threshold Jth, the fault is detected (t f ,det)
and the first stage of the controller reconfigura-
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Fig. 5 3-D Aircraft Visualization
Fig. 6 Cockpit Visualization with Fault Display
tion (see section 3.1.2) is initiated, so that the iso-
lated device is excluded from any control actions
(u = 0). The rather short detection time indicates
a satisfactory performance of the used detection
method. The detection of a fault also triggers the
fault identification process, which is successfully
accomplished at t f ,id , when the second phase of
the controller reconfiguration is initiated. In this
phase, the fault is handled as a measurable distur-
bance and is canceled in the feed-forward path of
the controller. When the fault disappears (t f ,dea),
still no inputs are commanded to the actuator,
as the systems requires some time to ’recognize’
that no fault is present any more. However, dur-
ing this period (t f ,dea < t < tnorm) the actuator re-
mains at its neutral position, not generating any
undesired moments. Finally, the control system
allocates the demanded deflections to the control
surfaces, as fault free operation of the surfaces is
possible again (t f ,norm).
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Fig. 7 Process and FDD signals for an actuator fault
5 Outlook
As certain faults are not detectable on a compo-
nent level due to for example the lack of a suf-
ficient number of sensors, future work will also
investigate detection filters designed for a sys-
tem wide approach. On this level robustness and
model uncertainties play a bigger role than on the
component level and the designed residual gener-
ators must be robust with respect to these uncer-
tainties.
Furthermore, global optimization techniques
will be used to find an optimal setting of the free
parameters within the FDD system to improve
the performance (e.g. false alarm fate, detection
delay), which may involve worst case search and
multi objective optimizations.
The environment can also serve for the clear-
ance of an FTC-based flight control systems,
which involves the robustness analysis of recon-
figured system stability and performance, and of
the reconfiguration performance in the presence
of parametric and flight condition uncertainties.
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